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Abstract
As more manufacturers shift their focus from selling products to end solutions, full-service
maintenance contracts gain traction in the business world. These contracts cover all maintenance
related costs during a predetermined horizon in exchange for a fixed service fee and relieve
customers from uncertain maintenance costs. To guarantee profitability, the service fees should
at least cover the expected costs during the contract horizon. As these expected costs may
depend on several machine-dependent characteristics, e.g. operational environment, the service
fees should also be differentiated based on these characteristics. If not, customers that are less
prone to high maintenance costs will not buy into or renege on the contract. The latter can
lead to adverse selection and leave the service provider with a maintenance-heavy portfolio,
which may be detrimental to the profitability of the service contracts. We contribute to the
literature with a data-driven tariff plan based on the calibration of predictive models that take
into account the different machine profiles. This conveys to the service provider which machine
profiles should be attracted at which price. We demonstrate the advantage of a differentiated
tariff plan and show how it better protects against adverse selection.
Keywords:maintenance, servitization, contract pricing, predictive analytics, risk management,
calibration
1 Introduction
Product maintenance plays a central role in the business model of several manufacturing firms as
they change their focus from selling products to selling product-service bundles. In the latter case,
firms are responsible for the maintenance and functionality of their products. This servitization
trend is motivated by the need to escape the product commoditization trap [Visnjic and Van Looy,
2013]. Service providers and OEMs in the capital goods industry offer a range of service contracts
to suit the needs of their customers. Maintenance can either be provided by on-call service, which
means that each preventive or corrective intervention is charged to the equipment user based on
materials used and time spent. Alternatively, maintenance can be offered under a service plan
such as a full-service contract. A full-service contract covers all future costs of preventive and
corrective maintenance, over a predetermined time horizon in exchange for a (series of) fee(s) or
fixed premium(s). Potentially, these contracts also include down-time compensation, to protect
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against the moral hazard of being served later than on-call customers. In practice, a company
could offer a combination of an on-call and a full-service contract. This hybrid contract could for
example only cover periodic maintenance or only certain failure types. Examples of companies
shifting their focus on services are General Electric Co., Siemens AG, and Hewlett-Packard Co.
[Sawhney et al., 2003].
In this paper, we study full-service contracts from the viewpoint of the service provider, who
offers (sells) the contract to the user of the equipment. Under a full-service contract, the user
no longer bears the risk of stochastic maintenance costs in exchange for the certitude of a fixed
service fee; shifting the risk to the service provider. For the service provider, these contracts offer
a guaranteed revenue stream. They are also profitable in case the total premium volume of a
portfolio, i.e. the collection of machines covered by a full-service contract, exceeds the maintenance
costs.
Accurate price setting is a major challenge for service providers offering full-service maintenance
contracts. Simply pricing full-service contracts based on historical estimation of expected total costs
incurred over the contract period plus a safety margin (e.g. a factor reflecting the risk-averseness
of the service provider times the standard deviation of the historical total costs) does not take
the heterogeneity between machines and customers into account. On the one hand, estimating
expected costs for only a subset of machines with equal characteristics (by subdividing the data
into different classes), stratifies the data into small sample sets for which costs cannot be accurately
estimated [Denuit et al., 2007]. As a consequence, a justified price differentiation for a specific
customer or machine is less straightforward. On the other hand, if all customers pay the same
price for a contract, this may lead to adverse selection. ‘Low-risk’ customers, who require less
maintenance and thus should be offered a lower price than maintenance-heavy customers, may
not sign a full-service contract when they pay the same premium as the high-risk customers. As
a result proportionally more high-risk customers will remain in the portfolio. This phenomenon is
also observed in insurance and is detrimental for the profitability of a service contracts portfolio.
Market research on services suggests that coming up with profitable service solutions is hard
[Gebauer et al., 2005; Hancock et al., 2005; Ulaga and Reinartz, 2011]; it seems that inadequate
pricing makes it hard to exploit the financial potential of extended services [Rapaccini, 2015].
In an era of big data and data analytics the collection and statistical analysis of data can provide
useful insights to many decision support systems, including tariff plans of full service contracts. We
propose a method to determine the price, or premium, of full-service contracts inspired by insights
and techniques developed in the actuarial literature. A full-service maintenance contract can be
considered an insurance covering the maintenance costs during a certain period of time. A key
concept in insurance pricing that can be carried over to pricing full-service maintenance contracts,
is the frequency-severity approach of handling claims or incurred costs [see e.g. Henckaerts et al.,
2018; Verbelen et al., 2018]. This involves modelling and predicting the frequency of failures and
their associated costs, i.e. severity, separately and (statistically) independent. A second element of
insurance pricing is the use of ‘risk factors’ to reflect the heterogeneity of the risks in the portfolio
[Henckaerts et al., 2018]. To avoid lapses in a competitive market, insurance companies use rating
factors (e.g. age, postal code area) to classify risks and to differentiate prices of their insurance
products. Pricing through risk classification is the mechanism for insurance companies to compete
as it allows an insurer to express which risk profiles should be attracted at which price. Insurance
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companies therefore maintain large databases with policy(holder) characteristics, i.e. contract and
customer information, and claim histories to build personalized risk-based pricing models.
Using predictive analytics we develop an approach similar to insurance analytics that takes
into account risk factors to predict the machine-specific costs under a full-service contract, and
price it accordingly. For example, the reliability of a machine can be influenced by operating
conditions, operator skills, service history and quality, among others. Some risk factors, such as
temperature or humidity, can have a direct influence on the reliability. Other risk factors are
proxies for the real influencing factor. For instance, the machine location can be a proxy for the
environmental conditions. This information can be collected either by sensors installed on the
machines, e.g. temperature measurements, or by sales people or technicians, at the time of sales
or at a maintenance intervention respectively. The latter is known as the Internet of people (IoP)
and the former as the Internet of things (IoT).
This idea is new in the context of pricing maintenance contracts and will be used to detect which
risk factors indicate significant differences in the expected number of maintenance interventions
(frequency) and the expected costs incurred (severity). Including these risk factors allows a machine
and customer specific tariff plan based on proper risk assessment. A differentiated tariff plan taking
the heterogeneity of the machine portfolio into account also provides a better protection against
adverse selection and makes the offering of the service provider more competitive.
Our predictive data-driven approach relies on the availability of historical data. We will demon-
strate our methodology on simulated data. The use of a simulation data provides a controlled
environment to study the performance of our methodology in different scenarios prior to applying
it to real data. We develop a simulation engine that is capable to simulate both (time-to-)failure
data, and repair and maintenance costs in a variety of different machine environments such that it
captures the heterogeneity in the contract data induced by the risk factors. The resulting data for-
mat is similar to what can be available to a service provider with a maintenance contract portfolio.
The latter has been verified with an industrial partner. We apply our predictive analytics models
to our simulated data to determine the break-even price, which is the minimum premium required
to have a profitable contract portfolio and we show the economic value of this pricing approach.
2 Literature
The literature on service maintenance contracts makes a distinction between resource-based service
and performance-based contracts. With resource-based service, maintenance is priced based on the
time and materials spent; it can either be on-call or by use of a full-service maintenance plan.
With on-call service the customer contacts the service provider in case of failure and is charged for
the corresponding maintenance. In contrast to full-service plans, the customer bears all the main-
tenance risk. We focus in this article on resource-based full-service contracts. Performance-based
contracts ensure the availability (or up-time) of the equipment, and their compensation is based
on the availability of the underlying product [Kim et al., 2017]. The literature comparing resource-
based and performance-based contracts indicates that product reliability is generally higher under
performance-based contracts [Guajardo et al., 2012; Bakshi et al., 2015]. Chan et al. [2018] study
sales and service records of medical equipment. Their dataset consists of service records for 700
devices over a four-year period including the maintenance visits and their associated part costs
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and labor. They analyze the frequency of maintenance visits using a Poisson regression model and
their associated part and labor costs using an exponential regression model. They find that moving
from on-call service to full-service plans reduces reliability and increases maintenance costs. Not
only do operators reduce the level of their own care of the equipment under full-service contracts,
the service provider also expends more resources to the equipment.
Rapaccini [2015] presents a general overview of the literature on pricing service contracts. He
distinguishes three pricing approaches: the price can be based on the predicted costs under the
contract; it can be based on the perceived value of the service contract; or it can be benchmarked
against the price of similar contracts offered by competitors. Our method is a cost-based pricing
approach, based on the expected costs of maintenance and repair, which can then be augmented
by a desired risk and profit margin. The stochastic and machine-dependent nature of the frequency
and severity of failures makes this a non-obvious exercise. When this pricing scheme is then bench-
marked with competition, small adaptations can be made for specific machine profiles to ensure
that the ‘desired’ profiles are attracted to the portfolio.
Huber and Spinler [2012, 2014] describe a value-based pricing approach for full-service repair
contracts, which do not include preventive maintenance. They first develop a cost-based price, based
on the failures and their associated costs, which are modelled independently by a non-homogeneous
Poisson process and a distribution with finite support. The value-based price is then obtained by
the customer’s choice (and utility) of on-call versus full-service, by means of a mean-variance
utility function. Huber and Spinler [2014] come up with a competition-based price by considering
competition with other service providers. Whereas Huber and Spinler [2012] set out a stochastic
model for the frequency of failures and associated costs to price full-service repair contracts, they
do not calibrate their model on (historical) maintenance data, neither do they assess the future
costs in a contract by a predictive model.
The non-renewing free replacement warranty policy, where the manufacturer repairs or replaces
a product at no cost, is similar to full-service contracts. It also involves an upfront payment of the
warranty price, which is included in the sales price. Luo and Wu [2018a,b] optimize the warranty
policy for different product types jointly, by determining the optimal warranty price and the optimal
length of the warranty period. The frequency of the incoming warranty claims and their associated
costs are modelled as statistically independent. Although the latter is similar to actuarial pricing
and the work by Huber and Spinler [2012, 2014], Luo and Wu [2018a,b] do not include product
characteristics (as risk factors) in their analysis, nor do they provide a data-driven approach to
optimize the warranty policy.
The asset covered by a full-service maintenance contract is a repairable system. The reliability
literature discusses how to model time-to-failure for these repairable systems taking into account
the effect of both preventive and corrective maintenance actions. We refer to Lindqvist et al. [2006],
Wu and Zuo [2010] and Doyen and Gaudoin [2011] for an introduction to these models. We use
their approach to model the frequency of failures for full-service maintenance contracts.
Motivated by the current state-of-the art in insurance pricing [see Denuit et al., 2007; De Jong et al.,
2008, for an overview], our paper extends the literature on service contracts by introducing a data-
driven pricing methodology to accommodate price differentiation based on a proper risk assess-
ment using predictive analytics. This is also in line with Luo and Wu [2018b]’s call for data-driven
methodologies for warranty contracts and Bertsimas and Kallus [2020]’s insights on the inclusion
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of covariate data in problems in operations research and management science.
3 Predictive analytics for full-service contracts
In this section we describe the different aspects of a full-service maintenance contract, introduce
its break-even price, and propose our methodology to calibrate this price using predictive models.
Appendix A gives an overview of the key notations used in the paper.
3.1 Problem description
We consider a service provider who provides maintenance to a collection of machines, potentially
of different type, under a full-service contract. We denote this collection of full-service contracts
as the contract portfolio. A full-service contract covers all maintenance and repair costs for that
machine during a period [t0, t0+∆t], with ∆t the finite and predetermined duration of the contract.
The start of the contract t0 can either be the moment of the machine sale or a later moment. The
start t0 can be different for the different machines in the portfolio. During this coverage period ∆t,
nm(∆t) preventive maintenance interventions are included in the contract, which are typically also
scheduled at initiation of the contract. Whereas nm(∆t) is usually deterministic, the associated
costs of preventive maintenance, Sj for j ∈ {1, 2, ..., nm(∆t)}, are not. We will assume that each
preventive maintenance is of the same type and has the same effectiveness. This does not mean
that all preventive maintenances have exactly the same cost – we assume they are intrinsically
stochastic, but this difference in costs is not related to the effectiveness; as a result in our model
the cost of the preventive maintenance does not impact the subsequent failure intensity. We note
that the influence of preventive maintenance actions could be further incorporated via time-varying
covariates in our statistical models. These time-varying covariates could represent e.g. the time since
last maintenance event, the number of maintenance events in the past year, the cost of the last
preventive maintenance, etc.
The contract additionally covers the costs of the corrective maintenance due to unplanned fail-
ures and/or due to malfunctioning of a component of the machine that requires repair or even
replacement. These can be minor failures, requiring minimal corrective maintenance, or catas-
trophic failures requiring a major overhaul of the machine. Both the corrective maintenance and
the overhaul are unplanned and consequently their occurrence and timing are stochastic. We dis-
tinguish between nf different types of failures, and denote Nf,i(∆t) the number of failures of type
i that occur during the contract period [t0, t0 +∆t] and Xi,k the associated cost of the kth failure
of type i. Both Nf,i(∆t) and Xi,k are unknown at initiation of the contract.
Figure 1 illustrates the timeline of a contract during the coverage period [t0, t0+∆t], with on the
horizontal axis (indicating the time dimension) the planned preventive maintenance interventions
mj and the unplanned failures of type i, fi,k. The vertical lines, for every event, represent the size
of the associated costs, Sj and Xi,k respectively. The probability density functions on the vertical
axis illustrate the stochastic nature of these costs.
The total costs covered by the service contract, C(∆t), equal the total aggregated failure costs
F (∆t) and the total aggregated preventive maintenance costs, M(∆t), covered by the contract
over the period ∆t:
C(∆t) = F (∆t) +M(∆t), (1)
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Figure 1: A full-service contract covers all costs of preventive maintenance interventions mj and
unplanned failures fi,k, of failure type i, with respective costs Sj and Xi,k during the coverage
period [t0, t0 +∆t].
with
F (∆t) =
nf∑
i=1
Nf,i(∆t)∑
k=1
Xi,k, (2)
and
M(∆t) =
nm(∆t)∑
j=1
Sj. (3)
We consider the occurrence of a failure and its associated cost to be statistically independent, in
line with most literature [Huber and Spinler, 2012; Luo and Wu, 2018a,b; Henckaerts et al., 2018].
Taking the dependence between frequency and severity into account is much more involved. This
has for instance been done by Gschlo¨ßl and Czado [2007] and Czado et al. [2012]. The assumption
of independence between severity and frequency of failures is typical in insurance pricing and makes
the frequency and severity analysis more tractable.
The preventive maintenance scheme influences the occurrence of failures and consequently af-
fects the failure costs F (∆t). We consider this maintenance scheme exogenous [as in e.g. Poppe et al.,
2018] and focus on determining the premium given this maintenance scheme. When this preventive
maintenance scheme would be optimized by trading off the cost of preventive maintenance with
the cost of failure [see e.g. Barlow and Hunter, 1960; Rebaiaia et al., 2017], the expected costs and
resulting break-even price are adapted accordingly.
The heterogeneity between machines in the portfolio is reflected in the variety in costs, C(∆t)
incurred for different machines. Some machines may incur more failures and/or costs than others,
as Figure 2 illustrates. In Figure 2, machine 2 is more expensive to maintain during the contract
horizon than machine 1 due to more failures. This heterogeneity in the costs motivates the need
for a differentiated tariff plan. We will use observable and measurable risk factors to reflect this
heterogeneity and set prices accordingly. These risk factors can be both static, e.g. the country of
residence, operational environment, operator and maintenance crew skill level, as well as dynamic
over time, e.g. the temperature of the machine, maintenance and service history [Barabadi, 2012;
Barabadi et al., 2014; Nouri Qarahasanlou et al., 2016]. This requires the service provider to keep
track of the values of these risk factors for each machine, at contract initiation (static) as well as
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Figure 2: Two simulated timelines, where the heterogeneity in the machine population is reflected
by different maintenance costs during the contract horizon of 5 years.
over time (dynamic).
3.2 Technical price of full-service contracts
Denote P (∆t) the premium paid at initiation of the contract, and R(∆t) the profit at termination
of the contract,
R(∆t) = P (∆t)− C(∆t). (4)
The break-even or technical price P ⋆(∆t) is the premium for which the expected profit E[R(∆t)] =
0. The commercial price P (∆t) includes additional loadings added to the break-even price P ⋆(∆t),
e.g. risk margins, profit margins, commissions and expenses, adjustments based on a competi-
tive analysis in collaboration with the marketing department. Risk margins that account for the
risk-averseness of the service provider and distributional properties of the incurred costs, can be
determined by making use of so-called ‘premium principles’ [Kaas et al., 2008] studied in actuarial
science. The break-even price P ⋆(∆t) is expressed as
P ⋆(∆t) = E[C(∆t)] = E

 nf∑
i=1
Nf,i(∆t)∑
k=1
Xi,k +
nm(∆t)∑
j=1
Sj


=
nf∑
i=1
E[Nf,i(∆t)] ·E[Xi,k] + nm(∆t) ·E[Sj ],
(5)
where the last equality assumes independence between the frequency of failure and their associated
costs. Equation (5) shows how the break-even price depends on the expected frequency of failure
E[Nf,i(∆t)] and the number of preventive maintenance actions nm(∆t) on the one hand and the
expected severity of failure and preventive maintenance, E[Xi,k] and E[Sj ] resp., on the other
hand. To account for machine heterogeneity, we need to determine the technical price P ⋆(∆t)
conditional on the machine characteristics, which are represented by covariates that can be fixed,
x1, or time-varying, x2(t):
P ⋆(∆t)|x1,x2(t) =
nf∑
i=1
E[Nf,i(∆t)|x1,x2(t)] · E[Xi,k|x1,x2(t)] + nm(∆t) ·E[Sj |x1,x2(t)]. (6)
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In the above expression, the machine characteristics impact both the expected frequency of failure
and the expected costs of maintenance and failure. The resulting conditional break-even price
P ⋆(∆t)|x1,x2(t) will then be different for each machine profile, reflecting the heterogeneity in the
machine population.
3.3 Data description
To apply our pricing methodology, a dataset is required with a history of failures and preventive
maintenance interventions, together with their costs. We rely on maximum likelihood estimation
to fit the time-to-failure, failure types and costs distribution on this dataset. The purpose of this
calibration is to obtain data driven values for the parameters used in the distributions, instead
of fixing parameter values upfront without taking the available data into account. This dataset
stores the maintenance activities performed on each machine in the portfolio of, say n, machines,
during an observation window tobs. Each machine has a number of characteristics or covariates
x (= x1 ∪ x2(t)), where we make a distinction between time-independent x1 and time-dependent
x2(t) covariates. We consider nf = 1 + nf,minor different failure types, consisting of nf,minor minor
failure types on the one hand and a catastrophic failure on the other hand. The minor failures
types, denoted {f1, f2, ..., fnf,minor}, require minimal, as-good-as-old corrective maintenance [see
e.g. Lindqvist et al., 2006; Wu and Zuo, 2010; Doyen and Gaudoin, 2011], which does not impact
the overall reliability of the machine. Catastrophic failures, denoted fc, require a full overhaul of
the machine and bring the machine in a new state. The overhaul is considered a perfect correc-
tive maintenance and the virtual age [Kijima, 1989] of the machine is zero afterwards [Sheu et al.,
2012]. Furthermore, the periodic maintenance events, denoted m, follow a time-based preventive
maintenance strategy specified by the maintenance interval ∆tPM. This fixes the number of peri-
odic maintenance actions nm(∆t) during the contract duration ∆t. Table 1 provides an excerpt
of such a dataset. Each line corresponds to a failure or preventive maintenance and takes the
form: (i, t, t−, c, y,X, x1,x2(t)), with i the machine number, t the event time, t− the time of the
previous failure or maintenance (if the current event is respectively a failure or maintenance), c
the censoring status with c = 1 if the event is observed and c = 0 if the timeline is censored,
y ∈ {m, f1, f2, ..., fnf,minor , fc} the type of the event, X the costs, and x1 and x2(t) the values of
respectively the fixed and time-dependent covariates of a machine at the event time t. The time-
line of a machine is censored at the end of a contract as well as at the end of the period of data
collection, since both the ending of the contract as well as the historical data collection prevent the
observation of the next failure. In Table 1, the covariate x1 represents the (static) country code
and x2(t) indicates 1 if a type 3 failure has occurred in the past, and zero otherwise. The event
timeline of a single machine is defined by the set of all events registered on the same machine in
the dataset, see Table 1.
8
Table 1: Excerpt of a dataset required to price full-service contracts, detailing for each failure
and preventive maintenance the machine number i, the time stamp t of the event time and its
previous occurrence t−, its censoring status c, type y and costs X, together with the values of the
machine-dependent covariates, x1 and x2(t).
i t t− c y X x1 x2(t)
1 0.12 0 1 f3 229.31 BE 0
1 1 0 1 m 63.06 BE 1
1 1.53 0.12 1 f2 230.97 BE 1
...
...
...
1 3.14 3.09 0 0 0 BE 1
...
...
...
n 1 0 1 m 46.98 NL 0
n 2 1 1 m 77.31 NL 0
n 3 2 1 m 54.10 NL 0
n 3.49 0 1 f3 195.78 NL 0
...
...
...
n 5 4.99 0 0 0 NL 1
4 Calibration of predictive models for pricing
Making use of maximum likelihood estimation, we calibrate predictive models to the contract data,
as described in Section 3.3, capturing the failure occurrences, failure types, and the failure and
maintenance costs observed over the machine-specific timelines. We hereby identify the impact of
the machine-dependent characteristics x1 and x2(t) to determine a machine-dependent technical
(break-even) price P ⋆|x1,x2(t).
4.1 Likelihoods of the predictive models
We propose a hierarchical approach inspired by Frees and Valdez [2008] and decompose the joint
probability distribution of the contract data in its stochastic elements: failure times and types,
costs of failures and maintenance events. The joint probability distribution of the timeline of a
single machine with failure times T , failure types Y , failure costs X and maintenance costs S
denoted by f(T ,Y ,X,S), can be decomposed as follows:
f(T ,Y ,X,S) = f(T ,Y ) · f(X|T ,Y ) · f(S|T ,Y ,X), (7)
where covariates are omitted to promote legibility.
Time-to-failure likelihood The first component f(T ,Y ) deals with the failures times and
types. First, we analyze the failure times while only distinguishing between minor, denoted fm, and
catastrophic, denoted fc, failures. To price full-service maintenance contracts, it is not necessary
to know the exact failure times, it suffices to estimate the number of failures during the contract
period, see Equation (5). This gives us two possible approaches to model the data on occurrences
of failures as observed over the lifetime of a machine or service contract. On the one hand we can
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propose and calibrate a time-to-failure model which uses the full detail of the failure times, as
displayed in Table 1. Such a model does not only allow to assess the number of failures during the
contract horizon, but also to predict the failure times. On the other hand, aggregating the time-
to-failure data into discrete time periods allows the use of count models. Such regression models
predict the number of failures in a next time period. In line with the granularity of the data in
Table 1, we opt for time-to-failure models as they provide more detail than count models.
To calibrate the time-to-failure model, we maximize its specific time-to-event log-likelihood.
Each failure in the dataset is characterized by a vector (y, t, t0, c), where y ∈ {fm, fc} is the
failure type, t indicates the failure time, t0 the time of the previous failure and c ∈ {0, 1}, with 0
indicating censoring of the event. In first instance we aggregate the different minor failure types,
{f1, f2, ..., fnf,minor}, as a single type fm. The contribution of each failure to the log-likelihood is,
c log(λy(t)) + log(ST (t|t0)). (8)
Summing over all machines and failures gives the full log-likelihood. λy(t) is the type-specific failure
intensity function and ST (t|t0) is the survival function for the time-to-next-failure,
ST (t|t0) = exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
λtotal(u)du
)
. (9)
The total failure intensity λtotal(t) is the sum of the type-specific failure intensity functions for
the minor and the catastrophic failures and totally specifies the survival function ST (t|t0) for the
time-to-next-failure.
The type-specific failure intensity function λy(t) for the minor failures, denoted λfm(t), is
machine-specific and depends on the machine characteristics χ1 ⊆ x1 and χ2(t) ⊆ x2(t) as follows:
λfm(t) = λ0(t) exp(β
′
1 · χ1 + β
′
2 · χ2(t)). (10)
We denote χ1 and χ2(t) as the subset of the machine characteristics incorporated in the failure
intensity for minor failures. Not all characteristics available in the data necessarily influence the
failure intensity. This failure intensity function consists of a baseline λ0(t), i.e. common to all
machines, and proportional influence of the covariates [Cox, 1975]. The effect of the covariates
scales the failure intensity function but does not influence its functional form. The baseline failure
intensity λ0(t) depends on the preventive maintenance scheme, defined by the maintenance interval
∆tPM. For a time-based imperfect preventive maintenance with interval ∆tPM, the baseline failure
intensity is characterized by [Lindqvist et al., 2006; Wu and Zuo, 2010]:
λ0(t) = αλ0 ·
(
(t mod ∆tPM) + (1− κλ0)
⌊
t
∆tPM
⌋)
+ γλ0 , (11)
where αλ0 ∈ R
+
0 is the scale, γλ0 ∈ R
+ is the intercept and κλ0 ∈ [0, 1] is the improvement after each
maintenance. The modulo operator mod returns the remainder after Euclidian division. The floor
operator ⌊·⌋ gives as output the greatest integer smaller than the argument. Figure 3 illustrates
the influence of κλ0 on the baseline failure intensity function. After each preventive maintenance
action, the failure intensity decreases with κλ0 percentage. Consequently, the effectiveness of each
preventive maintenance action is the same. The closer κλ0 gets to one, the better the maintenance;
10
02
4
6
0 1 2 3 4 5
t
κλ0 = 0.3
0
1
2
3
4
0 1 2 3 4 5
t
κλ0 = 0.6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
0 1 2 3 4 5
t
κλ0 = 1
λ 0
(t)
Figure 3: Baseline failure intensity λ0(t) for scale αλ0 = exp(0.5), intercept γλ0 = 0, maintenance
interval ∆tPM = 1 and different values of κλ0 (∈ {0.3, 0.6, 1}).
if κλ0 = 1 then the maintenance is perfect.
The type-specific failure intensity function λy(t) for the catastrophic failures, denoted λfc(t),
is modelled as follows
λfc(t) = κcα
κc
c t
κc−1. (12)
Here we assume a Weibull failure intensity, which is widely used in reliability engineering due to
its versatility and relative simplicity [Bobbio et al., 1980; Wang et al., 2000; Wu, 2019], but other
choices can be valid. In our model the risk factors do not influence the catastrophic failure mode,
however adding this influence is a possible extension of this model.
Maximizing the log-likelihood gives estimates for the model parameters, i.e. αλ0 , κλ0 and γλ0
for the baseline hazard, β1 and β2 for the influence of the machine covariates, and αc and κc for
the catastrophic failures.
Likelihood for minor failure types The component f(T ,Y ) also contains the failure types.
Previously, we incorporated only the distinction between minor and catastrophic failures. Now we
handle the different minor failure types. We estimate the parameters of a multinomial logit model
which delivers the probabilities for the minor failure types Y |(Y ∈ Nf,minor), where Nf,minor =
{f1, f2, ..., fnf,minor} [Frees and Valdez, 2008]. Using the observed data, the contribution to the log-
likelihood of an observed minor failure type y is
log (Pr[Y = y|Y ∈ Nf,minor]) . (13)
Summing over all machines and minor failures gives the full log-likelihood. Following Frees and Valdez
[2008], these probabilities are specified as
Pr[Y = y|Y ∈ Nf,minor,z] =
exp(α
′
yz)
1 +
∑nf,minor−1
n=1 exp(α
′
nz)
, ∀y < nf,minor
Pr[Y = nf,minor|Y ∈ Nf,minor,z] =
1
1 +
∑nf,minor−1
n=1 exp(α
′
nz)
,
(14)
where z denotes the covariates influencing the failure type probabilities. z can include a selection
of both fixed and time-dependent covariates, where the time-dependent covariates are evaluated
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at the failure time. These probabilities specify a multinomial distribution which is typically used
to classify multiclass data. If multiple minor failures occur at the same time, they are modelled as
a single minor (extra) failure type, e.g. type 3 could be the co-occurrence of a type 1 and a type
2 failure. Maximizing the log-likelihood gives estimates for the parameters αy driving each minor
failure type y (∈ Nf,minor).
1
Severity likelihood The last two components of the decomposition f(X|T ,Y ) and
f(S|T ,Y ,X) deal with the failure and maintenance costs respectively. We compose a distributional
model for the costs using marginal severity distributions on the one hand and a copula for the
dependency of costs in case of co-occurring failures on the other hand. We model the probability
density function of the preventive maintenance costs with a positive and right-skewed distribution,
e.g. a gamma distribution,
S
d
∼ fS(µ, σ) (15)
with µ the location parameter and σ the scale parameter. We use the following parameterization
for the location parameters: g(µ) = γ
′
w, where the link function g(.) is chosen in such a way
that the location is positive. We include heterogeneity in these costs through a set of contract
specific covariates w. Once again, these covariates w can include a selection of both fixed and
time-dependent covariates, where the time-dependent covariates are evaluated at the failure time.
Maximizing the log-likelihood gives estimates for γ. A similar approach can be followed for minor
failure costs Xy (with y ∈ Nf,minor) and the catastrophic failure costs Xy (with y = fc). We make
a distinction between the cost distribution of the minor and catastrophic failures, because they are
different in nature. We denote the influencing covariates on the minor and catastrophic failures as
wy and wc respectively. The parameters of the cost distributions of the minor and catastrophic
failures are denoted as µy, σy and γy (with y ∈ Nf,minor) and µc, σc and γc respectively. A copula
with positive dependence, e.g. the Frank copula, captures the statistical dependence between the
multiple minor failures costs occurring at the same time [Frees and Valdez, 2008]. We opt for a
positive dependence since we assume high failure costs in a failure type will induce high failure
costs in the other co-occurring failure type.
4.2 From predictive models to pricing
Based on the calibrated predictive models, the break-even price P ⋆ in Equations (5) and (6), can
now be determined. We make this explicit by reformulating the break-even price in function of the
predictive models, taking into account the risk factors:
P ⋆|χ1,χ2(t),w,wy,wc,z = E[Nf,c|χ1,χ2(t)] ·E[Xc|wc]
+ E[Nf,minor|χ1,χ2(t)] ·
nf,minor∑
y=1
Pr[Y = y|Y ∈ Nf,minor,z] · E[Xy|wy]
+ nm ·E[S|w],
(16)
where E[Nf,minor|χ1,χ2(t)] is the predicted number of minor failures within the contract duration
and E[Nf,c|χ1,χ2(t)] the predicted number of catastrophic failures for machine characteristics
1In the R [R Core Team, 2017] package ‘nnet’ [Venables and Ripley, 2002], maximum likelihood estimation for
the multinomial logit model is available.
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χ1 and χ2(t), obtained from the predictive time-to-failure models with likelihood given in Equa-
tion (8). Remark that the explicit dependence of the price on the contract duration is omitted from
Equation (16), however it is evident that its components are dependent on the contract duration.
As the break-even price depends on the machine characteristics, different tariff plans are generated
depending on the set of characteristics that are included in the predictive models. As the contract
portfolio of the service provider grows, or changes, the models should be re-calibrated to learn from
this new data.
Note that the estimates from the predictive models could also be used for other purposes than
pricing. An example of this would be data-driven maintenance optimization, where the predictive
models for the failure intensity could serve as an input for the optimization of the preventive
maintenance interval.
5 Simulation engine and numerical experiment
5.1 Motivation and properties
We develop an engine to generate maintenance and failure data for a portfolio of machines re-
flecting their heterogeneity induced by the different risk factors. This engine allows testing the
performance and adequacy of our analytic models [Bender et al., 2005; Metcalfe and Thompson,
2006; Montez-Rath et al., 2017]. Simulated data provide a controlled environment to study the
performance of the methodology in different scenarios preparatory to applying it to real data. At
the same time, simulated data provide a recipe for data collection since real data (after cleaning)
should have a similar format and features as the simulated data.
The dataset used for pricing should contain the time stamps of failures, including their type and
associated costs, the time of preventive maintenance and their costs, together with the machine
characteristics. Simulating event occurrences and their associated impact (as in Figure 1) is not
straightforward, as extensively documented in the biostatistical literature where the recurrence of
events during an individual’s lifetime is studied [Metcalfe and Thompson, 2006; Beyersmann et al.,
2009; Hendry, 2014; Jahn-Eimermacher et al., 2015; Pe´nichoux et al., 2015]. The simulation engine
should be capable of handling the following list of analytic ingredients. First, the engine simulates
the occurrence of recurrent events over time [Cook and Lawless, 2007; Pe´nichoux et al., 2015] to
generate multiple occurrences of the same type of failure. Next, the engine generates occurrences
of different types of events [Beyersmann et al., 2009; Frees and Valdez, 2008] of which some can
be terminal, i.e. equivalent to death in the biostatistical setting. The data should also include
machine characteristics, which can be time-independent [Metcalfe and Thompson, 2006], e.g. the
country of residence, operational environment, operator and maintenance crew skill level, or time-
dependent [Hendry, 2014], e.g. temperature, maintenance and service history, which impact failure
times, types and costs, and maintenance costs. To introduce non-observable heterogeneity, i.e. not
reflected by the observed machine characteristics, the engine could be extended with the inclusion
of frailties or random effects [Pe´nichoux et al., 2015]. Machines may have exactly the same risk
factors, but at the same time some of them might fail significantly more. The inclusion of frailties
creates additional complexity; since our focus is on observable risk factors, we have not included
them in our model. Finally, risk-free intervals [Jahn-Eimermacher et al., 2015], during which no
failures can occur, may account for the actual duration of a maintenance intervention.
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5.2 Set up of the engine
We generate data for each machine i (∈ {1, 2, ..., n}) in a portfolio of n = 5 000 machines, during an
observation time tobs,i. These machines could be of different types, in which case the machine type
should be added as an extra covariate. In our numerical experiment we will assume that all machines
have the same type. The observation time of each machine is either 5 years or uniformly distributed
between three and five years. We simulate each machine in a time window [t0,i, t0,i+tobs,i]. Without
loss of generality we will consider t0,i = 0 for all machines. Each machine i has a number of
characteristics or covariates xi (= x1,i ∪ x2,i(t)), where we make a distinction between time-
independent x1,i and time-dependent x2,i(t) covariates. Each machine has 4 fixed covariates, x1 =
(x1,1, x1,2, x1,3, x1,4)
T ∈ {0, 1}4. For the purpose of simulation, we randomly allocate the values
with equal probability to the fixed covariates. We adhere to a general specification of the fixed
covariates, while in reality these will collect machine-specific risk factors as outlined in Section 1.
We let x2(t) indicate the time-varying covariate whether a type 3 minor failure has occurred,
x2(t) =


0, if no type 3 minor failure has occurred before t
1, if at least one type 3 minor failure has occurred before t.
(17)
The time-varying covariate x2(t) can be seen as a collateral damage of a type 3 failure: i.e. if a type
3 failure occurs, the overall reliability of the machine deteriorates. Other time-varying covariates
could represent e.g. the time since last maintenance event, the number of maintenance events in
the past year, the cost of the last preventive maintenance, etc.
Next, we determine the number of failure types nf = 1 + nf,minor, with nf,minor the number of
minor failure types, and we additionally consider one catastrophic failure. We consider nf,minor = 3
minor failure types (type 1, type 2 and type 3), of which type 3 is the co-occurrence of failures
of type 1 and 2. The number of periodic maintenance actions during the contract duration is
determined by fixing the maintenance interval ∆tPM = 1. In our experiment, we let the covariates
only impact the distribution of the time-to-failure and failure types, but not the costs, although
that should not necessarily be the case. Consequently χ1 = x1 and χ2(t) = x2(t), z = x1, and
w = ∅,wy = ∅ and wc = ∅ in Equations (10), (14) and (15) respectively. An overview of the
simulation parameters can be found in Table 4 in Appendix C.
We provide the pseudo-code of our simulation engine in Algorithm 1, see Appendix B. In what
follows we describe how the algorithm generates for each machine i failures (times, types and costs),
and periodic maintenance actions (and their associated costs) within the observation time tobs,i.
Failure times Failure times are generated independent of the failure type by the function
getFailureTime(xi,tprevious), where xi (= x1,i ∪ x2,i(t)) is the covariate vector of machine i
and tprevious the event time of the previous failure on machine i. We simulate the failure times
making use of failure intensities, see Equations (10) and (12) for minor and catastrophic failures
respectively. Recurrent minor failure times as well as a catastrophic (terminal) failure are gen-
erated from λtotal(t) making use of inverse transform sampling [Metcalfe and Thompson, 2006;
Cook and Lawless, 2007; Jahn-Eimermacher et al., 2015; Pe´nichoux et al., 2015]. To facilitate in-
verse transform sampling, the time-varying covariates x2,i(t) should be piecewise constant functions.
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The latter is the case for our simulation.
Failure type For each failure with failure time t, the function getFailureType(xi,t) generates
the failure type Y through a two-step process, where xi is the covariate vector of machine i. First,
we determine if the failure is minor or catastrophic. These failure types occur with probabilities
[Beyersmann et al., 2009],
Pr[Y = fm] =
λfm(t)
λtotal(t)
Pr[Y = fc] =
λfc(t)
λtotal(t)
,
(18)
for a failure at time t. Minor and catastrophic failures cannot occur at the same time in the current
specification of the model. However, the simulation engine could be extended by introducing an
extra event-type capturing the co-occurrence of a minor failure and catastrophic failure with its
own specific failure intensity.
Second, the type of a minor failure, i.e. {f1, f2, ..., fnf,minor}, is generated by sampling from a
multinomial distribution [Frees and Valdez, 2008] with the probabilities of Equation (14). Multiple
coinciding minor failures are modelled as a single minor failure type, in our set-up type 3 is the
co-occurrence of a type 1 and a type 2 failure.
Costs of failure and maintenance We generate Sj, the costs of the jth maintenance, and
Xy,k, the costs of the kth failure of type y, with the functions getMaintenanceCosts(xi) and
getFailureCosts(xi, y). Hereto, we simulate from a positive and right-skewed distribution, i.e.
a gamma distribution. The specifications of the distributions were introduced in Equation (15). A
copula with positive dependence, i.e. the Frank copula, captures the statistical dependence between
the costs of minor failures occurring at the same time [Frees and Valdez, 2008].
Figure 4 illustrates the generated event time-lines of three arbitrary machines, which result from
our simulation engine.
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Figure 4: Simulated time-lines for three machines during an observation length of (at most) five
years
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Figure 5: Relative exposure of the machine portfolio per contract (top left), in the time-varying
covariate x2(t) (bottom left) and in the fixed covariates x1 (right)
5.3 Data exploration
Empirical distribution of exposure and covariates We first explore the distribution of the
‘exposure(-to-risk)’ of our simulated contract portfolio [Denuit et al., 2007]. This quantifies the risk
each machine in the dataset is exposed to, expressed in terms of its observation time tobs. Although
we use time as the unit of exposure, machine run-time could equally be used. The relative exposure
for each machine i is
relative exposurei =
exposure of machine i
total exposure
=
tobs,i∑n
i=1 tobs,i
. (19)
Summing the relative exposures for machines taking the same values in the risk factors leads
to Figure 5. Figure 5 (top left panel) illustrates that for our dataset, more than 80% of the total
exposure is represented by machines for which five years of data is available. Figure 5 (right panels)
shows that each fixed covariate in x1 has equal exposure in each of its values in the dataset, whereas
the type 3 minor failure (represented by the time-varying covariate x2(t)) is only observed (at least
once) in less than 20% of the total exposure.
Influence of the covariates We explore the influence of the covariates on the number of failures
by picturing the empirical failure frequency for specific machine profiles, e.g. machines with x1,1 =
1. This empirical failure frequency is expressed as the ratio of the number of failures of a specified
type and the total exposure, both calculated for the machine profile under consideration. Taking
the ratio is necessary to take the exposure (observation time) into account, since more failures
are expected when a machine profile is observed for a longer period. Figure 6 illustrates how the
covariates influence the failure behaviour for the minor failures, illustrated for minor failure type
1, but have no influence on the catastrophic failures.
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Figure 6: Empirical failure frequency for type 1 minor and catastrophic failures as a function of
the observed covariates.
5.4 Calibration of the predictive models and resulting pricing schemes
Table 4 (see Appendix C) provides the estimated parameters and their 95%−confidence intervals
resulting from the calibration of the predictive models using the calibration strategy outlined in
Section 4. The confidence intervals follow from the properties of maximum likelihood estimators.
The choice (or availability) of the machine-dependent covariates χ1,χ2(t), z, w,wy and wc
determines the tariff plan. For a real-life dataset, the relevant covariates have to be obtained by
means of variable selection strategies [Henckaerts et al., 2018]. For the purpose of our experiment,
however, we assume all covariates are relevant and omit the selection step. In what follows, we
introduce three different tariff plans with respective break-even prices P ⋆a , P
⋆
b and P
⋆
c . In tariff
plan a we do not include any covariates, which means there is no price differentiation and all
customers pay the same price. Tariff plan b only takes the fixed covariates into account, and tariff
plan c takes both the fixed and time-dependent covariates into account, see Table 2. We calibrate
the predictive models for each combination of covariates taken into consideration.
For each machine profile, Figure 7 displays the resulting break-even prices prescribed by the
different tariff plans for a contract duration of two years. The different machine profiles arise from
the four fixed covariates in vector x1, taking two different levels each. Additionally, a machine
either has experienced a minor failure of type 3 before the start of the contract, x2(t = 0) = 1,
Table 2: The set of covariates takes into account for the tariff plans a, b and c.
a b c
failure time χ1 ∅ x1 x1
χ2(t) ∅ ∅ x2(t)
failure types z ∅ x1 x1
costs w,wy,wc ∅ ∅ ∅
17
or not, x2(t = 0) = 0. This leads to 32 different machine profiles upon initiation of the contract,
resulting in 32 different prices under tariff plan c. Tariff plan b does not take into account the
time-varying covariate x2(t) and as such it generates only 16 different prices. Tariff plan a returns
the same price for every machine profile since it does not consider any risk factors.
Although the average, over all machine profiles, break-even price under all tariff plans is very
similar, the difference between the price under tariff a and the prices under tariffs b and c can be
quite significant. This effect arises because tariff a overcharges low risk machines and undercharges
high risk machines. The difference between tariff b and c is less pronounced since the influence of
the time-varying covariate is minor. It is necessary to stress that the price of a one-year contract
is not half of the two-year contract prices displayed in Figure 7, nor is the price of a four-year
contract double the price of a two-year contract. The price of the contracts is non-homogeneous in
time since the failure intensity is non-homogeneous.
tariff a tariff b tariff c
(1, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0, 0, 1) (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0, 1, 1) (0, 1, 0, 1, 0)0
100
200
br
ea
k−
ev
e
n
 p
ric
e 
P*
(1, 0, 1, 0, 0) (1, 0, 1, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0, 0, 1) (0, 1, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (0, 0, 1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) (0, 1, 1, 1, 0) (0, 1, 1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 1, 0, 1)0
100
200
br
ea
k−
ev
e
n
 p
ric
e 
P*
Figure 7: Break-even prices P ⋆ under the different tariff plans for each machine profile
(x1,1, x1,2, x1,3, x1,4, x2(t = 0)) for a two-year contract.
In Appendix D (Supplementary material) we provide the results of an extensive simulation
study, where we generate multiple portfolios of machines over time (along the recipe in Section
5.2) and calibrate the proposed hierarchical likelihood on each of these simulated datasets. The
purpose of this simulation study is to verify the accurracy of the calibration strategy described in
Section 4.
6 Model lift: Evaluation of different tariff plans
We evaluate the different tariff plans P ⋆a , P
⋆
b and P
⋆
c introduced in Table 2 for our simulated
portfolio of 5000 machines by comparing the collected service fees, with the actual, out-of-time
collected costs. We divide the machine data in two parts: an in-time training set to calibrate the
predictive models and to determine the prices, and an out-of-time set, which returns the actual
costs [Goldburd et al., 2016], see Figure 8. With our simulation engine we generate both in-time
data (with an observation time of maximum five years), as well as out-of-time data (five extra years
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Figure 8: The data is split in an in-time training set to calibrate the predictive models, and an
out-of-time set to evaluate the calibrated models.
Table 3: The out-of-time loss ratios for the three tariff plans over a two year horizon.
tariff plan a b c
loss ratio 0.992 0.989 0.994
data for each machine) with the same simulation settings. We not only measure the accuracy of
the tariff plan, i.e. the extent to which the tariff plan (calibrated in-time) covers the actual costs
(as observed out-of-time) in the portfolio, but also its capability to identify machine heterogeneity
and adapt prices accordingly.
6.1 Accuracy of tariff plans
The loss ratio for a given tariff plan is a measure for tariff accuracy. It is defined as the ratio of
the total actual costs realized in the entire contract portfolio over the total collected services fees
under the tariff plan. As such, we can express the loss ratio as follows,
loss ratio =
∑n
i=1 Ci(∆t)∑n
i=1 P
⋆
i (∆t)
, (20)
where the sum is over all contracts i in the portfolio. Table 3 confirms that over a horizon of two
years, the three considered tariff plans all have an out-of-time loss ratio close to one. Figure 9 plots
the out-of-time loss ratio over time, confirming Table 3 that the loss ratio rapidly stabilizes to a
value close to one. That means that at the (aggregated) level of the contract portfolio, all three
tariff plans are break-even. Nevertheless, that does not imply that each contract (at the level of
the individual machine) is expected to be break-even under the three tariff plans.
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Figure 9: The evolution of the out-of-time loss ratio over time.
6.2 Capability to differentiate
To measure the capability of a tariff plan to differentiate its prices based on the machine profiles
(and their corresponding risk), we use the so-called model lift [Goldburd et al., 2016]. A better
capability to differentiate prices implies that the contracts of each machine profile are expected to
be break-even, and it prevents adverse selection, as low-risk customers will be offered a lower price
than high-risk customers and thus have less incentive to leave.
Quantile plot The quantile plots in Figure 10 graphically compare the actual, out-of-time, total
costs incurred during the contract with the proposed machine-specific break-even price over a
two year horizon. For a portfolio of n contracts with price P ⋆i for machine i, incurred costs Ci
and machine characteristics xi (= x1,i ∪ x2,i(t)), the quantile plot is obtained by first sorting the
contracts in ascending order of price P ⋆i and binning them in equal groups, so-called quantiles; for
each bin we then compare the average costs against the corresponding average price. The quantile
plots in Figure 10 indicate that tariff plans b and c succeed in charging a higher price to the more
maintenance-heavy contracts. The gap between the average price and average costs for each bin is
small, indicating that the contracts in each bin are (close to) break-even on average. Tariff plan a
sorts the contracts randomly since all contracts have the same price and consequently each bin has
a similar average cost. This contrasts to tariffs b and c, who impose an ordering of the contracts
from maintenance-light to maintenance-heavy and as such there is an upward trend in average costs
for each quantile. Clearly, under tariff plan a, the average maintenance-light contract is profitable,
but the average maintenance-heavy contract is loss-making.
Adverse selection The heterogeneity in maintenance costs of the different contracts is identified
by tariff plans b and c that take into account the risk factors. These tariff plans effectively classify
contracts based on their risk and distinguish between maintenance intensive (high risk) versus
maintenance light (low risk) contracts. In Figure 10, we can observe that the first 5 quantiles
of contracts for tariff plans b and c have average costs and prices below 150. We will call these
contracts ‘low-risk’ contracts and we will call the 5 last quantiles ‘high-risk’ contracts. Since tariff
plan a charges all contracts more than 150, the low-risk customers have an incentive to renege from
their contract under tariff a. This would leave the service provider, in case he offers tariff plan a to
all customers, with a portfolio of high-risk contracts only. From Figure 10, we can see that these
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Figure 10: Quantile plot over a two year horizon for the different tariff plans. The height of the
bars indicate the average costs per bin and the red line the average price.
high-risk contracts have higher average costs than the premium charged by tariff plan a. This puts
the service provider at risk that he is left with a portfolio that is no longer break-even. In contrast,
tariff plans b and c charge a premium in line with the expected costs of a contract. Therefore, the
customers have less incentive to renege on their contract. Moreover, when customers leave, this is
not detrimental to the profitability since the lost premiums are in line with the costs, which in
that case no longer have to be covered by the service provider.
Lorenz curves and Gini index A Lorenz curve [Lorenz, 1905] is a tool to compare distributions,
frequently used in welfare economics. We use it here to gain insight in the distribution of incurred
costs and prices prescribed by the different tariff plans. The Lorenz curve is obtained by sorting
the machines i in ascending order of price P ⋆i , with the cumulative percentage of the machine
population on the abscissa and the cumulative percentage of costs Ci on the ordinate [Frees et al.,
2011, 2014]. The larger the gap between the Lorenz curve and the Line of Equality, i.e., the 45
degree line, the better the tariff plan’s capability to reflect heterogeneity between machines via a
differentiated price list. The Gini index [Gini, 1912] is twice the area between the Lorenz Curve
and the Line of Equality. Figure 11 shows the Lorenz curves and corresponding Gini coefficients for
the different tariff plans. The larger Gini index of tariff plans b and c indicate that they outperform
tariff plan a in differentiating between low-risk and high-risk contracts (which is expected since
tariff plan a charges every customer the same price). Remark that we can construct the Lorenz
curve for any tariff plan, since it only requires prices and costs as input. As such, we could use the
Lorenz curve and Gini index to evaluate our pricing methodology against current pricing practices.
Ordered Lorenz curves and Gini index As an extension to the Lorenz curves, Frees et al.
[2011, 2014] introduce ordered Lorenz curves. These consider whether an alternative tariff plan y is
preferred over the current plan x because it is better capable to differentiate prices. The relativity
Ri for contract i is defined by the ratio of the alternative tariff plan over the current plan,
Ri =
P ⋆y,i
P ⋆x,i
. (21)
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Figure 11: Lorenz curves (red) and Line of Equality (black) for the different tariff plans and costs
over two year horizon.
When both tariff plans cover the expected costs, the average Ri over all contracts i will be close to
one. A low relativity Ri < 1 indicates that price P
⋆
y,i is lower than P
⋆
x,i, suggesting that tariff plan
y is more competitive than tariff x for contract i, and contract i is potentially lost to a competitor
with tariff plan y. A high value Ri > 1 for contract i indicates that P
⋆
x,i is underpriced and could
indicate potential losses when adopting tariff x. Hence, the more contracts with a relativity differing
from 1, the worse tariff plan x is compared to y. This interpretation of the relativities assumes
that prices P ⋆y are a more accurate representation of the actual costs than P
⋆
x .
To set up the ordered Lorenz curve, the contracts in the portfolio are ordered in increasing
values of Ri. The distribution FP ⋆x (·) of the current prices P
⋆
x and distribution of the costs FC(·)
can then be calculated as:
FP ⋆x (s) =
∑n
i=1 P
⋆
x,i I(Ri ≤ s)∑n
i=1 P
⋆
x,i
FC(s) =
∑n
i=1Ci I(Ri ≤ s)∑n
i=1Ci
, (22)
with I(·) the indicator function, returning 1 if the argument is true and zero otherwise. The graph
(FP ⋆x (s), FC (s)) then defines the ordered Lorenz curve [Frees et al., 2011, 2014]. The associated
Gini index is again twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the Line of Equality.
Figure 12 shows a two-way comparison of the three tariff plans resulting in six ordered Lorenz
curves. As shown in the top left panel for tariff plan a, the contracts with lowest Ri are priced
too high with respect to their costs (i.e., contribute disproportional to the total price than to the
total costs), and vice versa for the contracts with high Ri. This results in a convex curve below
the Line of Equality. An ordered Lorenz curve corresponding to the Line of Equality (for instance
in the bottom panels) indicates that the cumulative percentage of the costs equals the cumulative
percentage of the prices, both in increasing relativities. Consequently, the alternative tariff y is
not preferred over the current tariff x. Tariff plan y is preferred over x in case the ordered Lorenz
curve is further away from the Line of Equality, indicating that more contracts have a relativity
further away from 1. The more convex the ordered Lorenz curve, the more tariff y can recognize
deficiencies in tariff x. The latter is equivalent with a larger Gini index. In this sense tariff plans b
and c both clearly dominate scheme a. The advantage of tariff c over b is, however, minor.
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Figure 12: Ordered Lorenz curves (red) and Line of Equality (black) for the different tariff plans
and costs over a two year horizon. An ordered Lorenz curve below the Line of Equality indicates
that tariff plan y is preferred over x.
23
7 Conclusions
We study full-service maintenance agreements that cover all maintenance costs over a predeter-
mined time horizon in exchange for a fixed premium. The stochastic and machine-dependent na-
ture of the maintenance costs renders the determination of the premium challenging for the service
provider. Inspired by insurance pricing, we use predictive analytics to determine the break-even
price based on customer- and machine-dependent characteristics. We build a simulation engine to
simulate data that reflect this heterogeneity in maintenance occurrences and their costs and we
show the economic value of price differentiation.
We demonstrate how price differentiation can help withstand adverse selection in case of a
machine population with diverse maintenance costs. We provide visual tools, such as quantile plots
and (ordered) Lorenz curves, and quantitative measures, i.e. the Gini coefficient, to provide insight
in the performance of the resulting tariff plans with respect to the heterogeneity of the machine
population and with respect to each other.
We propose a couple of directions for further research, some of which are relaxations of the
assumptions made in this paper. First, we assumed the independence between occurrence, or fre-
quency, of failures and their associated costs. The insurance pricing literature proposes to deal
with dependence between occurrence and costs of claims by making use of for instance copulas.
This approach could also be transferred to pricing full-service maintenance contracts. Second, we
have demonstrated our approach on simulated data. Although our simulation engine reflects a lot
of properties of real-world data, a validation of our approach on a real dataset seems a logical next
step. Third, our method relies on observable and measurable covariates to classify machines. We as-
sume that most of the heterogeneity between machines is captured by these measurable covariates
or risk factors. In the event that some heterogeneity is not explained by the observed covariates,
we could rely on frailties, also known as random effects, to model the unobserved heterogeneity.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank the anonymous referees and the editor for useful comments which led to signif-
icant improvements of the paper.
Bibliography
Bakshi, N., Kim, S.-H., and Savva, N. (2015). Signaling new product reliability with after-sales
service contracts. Management Science, 61(8):1812–1829.
Barabadi, A. (2012). Reliability and spare parts provision considering operational environment: A
case study. International Journal of Performability Engineering, 8(5).
Barabadi, A., Barabady, J., and Markeset, T. (2014). Application of reliability models with covari-
ates in spare part prediction and optimization–a case study. Reliability Engineering & System
Safety, 123:1–7.
Barlow, R. and Hunter, L. (1960). Optimum preventive maintenance policies. Operations Research,
8(1):90–100.
24
Bender, R., Augustin, T., and Blettner, M. (2005). Generating survival times to simulate Cox
proportional hazards models. Statistics in medicine, 24(11):1713–1723.
Bertsimas, D. and Kallus, N. (2020). From predictive to prescriptive analytics. Management
Science, 66(3):1025–1044.
Beyersmann, J., Latouche, A., Buchholz, A., and Schumacher, M. (2009). Simulating competing
risks data in survival analysis. Statistics in medicine, 28(6):956–971.
Bobbio, A., Cumani, A., Premoli, A., and Saracco, O. (1980). Modeling and identification of
nonexponential distributions by homogeneous Markov processes. In Proc. of the Sixth Advances
in Reliability Symposium.
Chan, T. H., de Ve´ricourt, F., and Besbes, O. (2018). Contracting in medical equipment mainte-
nance services: An empirical investigation. Management Science, 65(3):1136–1150.
Cook, R. J. and Lawless, J. (2007). The statistical analysis of recurrent events. Springer Science
& Business Media.
Cox, D. R. (1975). Partial likelihood. Biometrika, 62(2):269–276.
Czado, C., Kastenmeier, R., Brechmann, E. C., and Min, A. (2012). A mixed copula model for
insurance claims and claim sizes. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 2012(4):278–305.
De Jong, P., Heller, G. Z., et al. (2008). Generalized linear models for insurance data, volume 10.
Cambridge University Press Cambridge.
Denuit, M., Mare´chal, X., Pitrebois, S., and Walhin, J.-F. (2007). Actuarial modelling of claim
counts: Risk classification, credibility and bonus-malus systems. John Wiley & Sons.
Doyen, L. and Gaudoin, O. (2011). Modeling and assessment of aging and efficiency of corrective
and planned preventive maintenance. IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 60(4):759–769.
Frees, E. W., Meyers, G., and Cummings, A. D. (2011). Summarizing insurance scores using a
Gini index. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 106(495):1085–1098.
Frees, E. W., Meyers, G., and Cummings, A. D. (2014). Insurance ratemaking and a Gini index.
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 81(2):335–366.
Frees, E. W. and Valdez, E. A. (2008). Hierarchical insurance claims modeling. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 103(484):1457–1469.
Gebauer, H., Fleisch, E., and Friedli, T. (2005). Overcoming the service paradox in manufacturing
companies. European management journal, 23(1):14–26.
Gini, C. (1912). Italian: Variabilita` e mutabilita`. Variability and Mutability, C. Cuppini, Bologna.
Goldburd, M., Khare, A., and Tevet, D. (2016). Generalized linear models for insurance rating.
Casualty Actuarial Society, CAS Monographs Series, (5).
Gschlo¨ßl, S. and Czado, C. (2007). Spatial modelling of claim frequency and claim size in non-life
insurance. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 2007(3):202–225.
25
Guajardo, J. A., Cohen, M. A., Kim, S.-H., and Netessine (2012). Impact of performance-based
contracting on product reliability: An empirical analysis. Management Science, 58(5):961–979.
Hancock, M. Q., John, R. H., and Wojcik, P. J. (2005). Better B2B selling. McKinsey Quarterly,
38(3):15.
Henckaerts, R., Antonio, K., Clijsters, M., and Verbelen, R. (2018). A data driven binning strategy
for the construction of insurance tariff classes. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal, 2018(8):681–705.
Hendry, D. J. (2014). Data generation for the Cox proportional hazards model with time-dependent
covariates: a method for medical researchers. Statistics in medicine, 33(3):436–454.
Huber, S. and Spinler, S. (2012). Pricing of full-service repair contracts. European Journal of
Operational Research, 222(1):113–121.
Huber, S. and Spinler, S. (2014). Pricing of full-service repair contracts with learning, optimized
maintenance, and information asymmetry. Decision Sciences, 45(4):791–815.
Jahn-Eimermacher, A., Ingel, K., Ozga, A.-K., Preussler, S., and Binder, H. (2015). Simulating
recurrent event data with hazard functions defined on a total time scale. BMC medical research
methodology, 15(1):16.
Kaas, R., Goovaerts, M., Dhaene, J., and Denuit, M. (2008). Modern actuarial risk theory: using
R, volume 128. Springer Science & Business Media.
Kijima, M. (1989). Some results for repairable systems with general repair. Journal of Applied
probability, 26(1):89–102.
Kim, S.-H., Cohen, M. A., and Netessine, S. (2017). Reliability or inventory? an analysis of
performance-based contracts for product support services. In Handbook of Information Exchange
in Supply Chain Management, pages 65–88. Springer.
Lindqvist, B. H. et al. (2006). On the statistical modeling and analysis of repairable systems.
Statistical science, 21(4):532–551.
Lorenz, M. O. (1905). Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth. Publications of the
American statistical association, 9(70):209–219.
Luo, M. and Wu, S. (2018a). A mean-variance optimisation approach to collectively pricing war-
ranty policies. International Journal of Production Economics, 196:101–112.
Luo, M. and Wu, S. (2018b). A value-at-risk approach to optimisation of warranty policy. European
Journal of Operational Research, 267(2):513 – 522.
Metcalfe, C. and Thompson, S. G. (2006). The importance of varying the event generation process
in simulation studies of statistical methods for recurrent events. Statistics in medicine, 25(1):165–
179.
Montez-Rath, M. E., Kapphahn, K., Mathur, M. B., Purington, N., Joyce, V. R., and Desai, M.
(2017). Simulating realistically complex comparative effectiveness studies with time-varying
covariates and right-censored outcomes. arXiv preprint arXiv:1709.10074.
26
Nouri Qarahasanlou, A., Ataei, M., Khalokakaie, R., Ghodrati, B., and Jafarei, R. (2016). Tire
demand planning based on reliability and operating environment. Int. Journal of Mining &
Geo-Engineering, 50(2):239–248.
Pe´nichoux, J., Moreau, T., and Latouche, A. (2015). Simulating recurrent events that mimic
actual data: a review of the literature with emphasis on event-dependence. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1503.05798.
Poppe, J., Boute, R. N., and Lambrecht, M. R. (2018). A hybrid condition-based maintenance pol-
icy for continuously monitored components with two degradation thresholds. European Journal
of Operational Research, 268(2):515–532.
R Core Team (2017). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foundation
for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria.
Rapaccini, M. (2015). Pricing strategies of service offerings in manufacturing companies: a literature
review and empirical investigation. Production Planning & Control, 26(14-15):1247–1263.
Rebaiaia, M. L., Ait-kadi, D., and Jamshidi, A. (2017). Periodic replacement strategies: opti-
mality conditions and numerical performance comparisons. International Journal of Production
Research, 55(23):7135–7152.
Sawhney, M., Balasubramanian, S., and Krishnan, V. V. (2003). Creating growth with services.
MIT Sloan management review, 45(2):34–44.
Sheu, S.-H., Li, S.-H., and Chang, C.-C. (2012). A generalised maintenance policy with age-
dependent minimal repair cost for a system subject to shocks under periodic overhaul. Interna-
tional Journal of Systems Science, 43(6):1007–1013.
Ulaga, W. and Reinartz, W. J. (2011). Hybrid offerings: how manufacturing firms combine goods
and services successfully. Journal of marketing, 75(6):5–23.
Venables, W. N. and Ripley, B. D. (2002). Modern Applied Statistics with S. Springer, New York,
fourth edition. ISBN 0-387-95457-0.
Verbelen, R., Antonio, K., and Claeskens, G. (2018). Unravelling the predictive power of telem-
atics data in car insurance pricing. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C (Applied
Statistics), 67(5):1275–1304.
Visnjic, I. and Van Looy, B. (2013). Servitization: Disentangling the impact of service business
model innovation on manufacturing firm performance. Journal of Operations Management,
31(4):169–180.
Wang, W., Scarf, P., and Smith, M. (2000). On the application of a model of condition-based
maintenance. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 51(11):1218–1227.
Wu, S. (2019). A failure process model with the exponential smoothing of intensity functions.
European Journal of Operational Research, 275(2):502–513.
Wu, S. and Zuo, M. J. (2010). Linear and nonlinear preventive maintenance models. IEEE
transactions on reliability, 59(1):242 – 249.
27
A List Of Notations
B Pseudo-code of the simulation engine
Algorithm 1 Simulation of a realistic dataset of maintenance and failure events
1: initialization;
2: timeLinesPortfolio = ∅;
3: for i in {1, ..., n} do
4: t = 0;
5: tprevious = 0;
6: timeLineMachine = ∅;
7: while t ≤ tobs,i do
8: t = getFailureTime(xi, tprevious);
9: tprevious = t;
10: y = getFailureType(xi, t);
11: x = getFailureCosts(xi, y);
12: timeLineMachine ← [i, t, y, x];
13: end while
14: timeLineMachine ← [i, tobs,i, end, 0];
15: nPM =
⌊
tobs,i
∆tPM
⌋
;
16: for j in {1, ..., nPM} do
17: s = getMaintenanceCosts(xi);
18: timeLineMachine ← [i, j ·∆tPM,PM, s];
19: end for
20: timeLinesPortfolio ← timeLineMachine;
21: end for
C Results of the calibration of the predictive models in our nu-
merical experiment
We present the calibrated parameters and their 95%-confidence intervals of the predictive mod-
els for the simulation settings as introduced in Section 5 in Table 4. These are obtained by the
calibration of a single simulation run.
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Table 4: Overview of simulation parameters, estimated values and confidence intervals for the calibration and the pricing schemes. As different covariates
are taken into account, the outcome of the calibration will be different for each pricing scheme.
Parameter Simulation Calibration
estimate 95% conf.
interval
αλ0 0.5 0.472 (0.443, 0.502)
tPM 1 - -
κλ0 0.623 0.599 (0.571, 0.626)
γλ0 0.1 0.110 (0.097, 0.124)
β1 −0.2 −0.186 (−0.214,−0.157)
0.3 0.311 (.282, .339)
0.4 0.411 (0.382, 0.439)
−0.1 −0.097 (−0.125,−0.068)
β2 0.1 0.101 (0.066, 0.136)
αc 0.2 0.198 (0.195, 0.202)
κc 2 1.990 (1.936, 2.045)
α1 0.9 0.948 (0.845, 1.052)
0.4 0.363 (0.268, 0.459)
0.1 0.055 (−0.038, 0.149)
0.0 0.027 (−0.066, 0.121)
0.1 0.141 (0.048, 0.235)
α2 0.9 0.956 (0.853, 1.058)
0.5 0.474 (0.380, 0.568)
0.0 −0.033 (−0.125, 0.059)
0.2 0.213 (0.121, 0.306)
0.2 0.232 (0.140, 0.324)
γm 20 20.154 (19.798, 20.509)
3 2.984 (2.931, 3.038)
γ1 20 20.158 (19.530, 20.785)
3 2.984 (2.893, 3.081)
γ2 30 29.474 (28.626, 30.322)
5 5.100 (4.957, 5.253)
θ 0.5 0.509 (0.264, 0.753)
γc 20 19.813 (18.909, 20.718)
10 10.070 (9.625, 10.558)
Pricing scheme a Pricing scheme b Pricing scheme c
estimate 95% conf. estimate 95% conf. estimate 95% conf.
interval interval interval
0.620 (0.587, 0.654) 0.482 (0.453, 0.512) 0.472 (0.443, 0.502)
- - - - - -
0.590 (0.562, 0.617) 0.590 (0.563, 0.618) 0.599 (0.571, 0.626)
0.139 (0.123, 0.157) 0.108 (0.095, 0.122) 0.110 (0.097, 0.124)
- - −0.196 (−0.224,−0.168) −0.186 (−0.214,−0.157)
- - 0.316 (0.287, 0.344) 0.311 (.282, .339)
- - 0.415 (0.387, 0.444) 0.411 (0.382, 0.439)
- - −0.103 (−0.131,−0.074) −0.097 (−0.125,−0.068)
- - - - 0.101 (0.066, 0.136)
0.198 (0.195, 0.202) 0.198 (0.195, 0.202) 0.198 (0.195, 0.202)
1.990 (1.936, 2.045) 1.990 (1.936, 2.045) 1.990 (1.936, 2.045)
1.206 (1.160, 1.252) 0.948 (0.845, 1.052) 0.948 (0.845, 1.052)
- - 0.363 (0.268, 0.459) 0.363 (0.268, 0.459)
- - 0.055 (−0.038, 0.149) 0.055 (−0.038, 0.149)
- - 0.027 (−0.066, 0.121) 0.027 (−0.066, 0.121)
- - 0.141 (0.048, 0.235) 0.141 (0.048, 0.235)
1.368 (1.322, 1.413) 0.956 (0.853, 1.058) 0.956 (0.853, 1.058)
- - 0.474 (0.380, 0.568) 0.474 (0.380, 0.568)
- - −0.033 (−0.125, 0.059) −0.033 (−0.125, 0.059)
- - 0.213 (0.121, 0.306) 0.213 (0.121, 0.306)
- - 0.232 (0.140, 0.324) 0.232 (0.140, 0.324)
20.154 (19.798, 20.509) 20.154 (19.798, 20.509) 20.154 (19.798, 20.509)
2.984 (2.931, 3.038) 2.984 (2.931, 3.038) 2.984 (2.931, 3.038)
20.158 (19.530, 20.785) 20.158 (19.530, 20.785) 20.158 (19.530, 20.785)
2.984 (2.893, 3.081) 2.984 (2.893, 3.081) 2.984 (2.893, 3.081)
29.474 (28.626, 30.322) 29.474 (28.626, 30.322) 29.474 (28.626, 30.322)
5.100 (4.957, 5.253) 5.100 (4.957, 5.253) 5.100 (4.957, 5.253)
0.509 (0.264, 0.753) 0.509 (0.264, 0.753) 0.509 (0.264, 0.753)
19.813 (18.909, 20.718) 19.813 (18.909, 20.718) 19.813 (18.909, 20.718)
10.070 (9.625, 10.558) 10.070 (9.625, 10.558) 10.070 (9.625, 10.558)
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D Simulation study to verify the calibration method
To verify the calibration of our predictive models, we simulate 250 replications of the simulation
setting described in Section 5. The number of machines for this verification is equal to n = 1000,
in contrast to n = 5000 in Section 5, that we used to illustrate our pricing methodology. Each
replication leads a single estimate for the simulation parameters. Consequently it is possible to
compare these estimates with the simulation parameters by means of a boxplot. The boxplots for
the time-to-failure model parameters, multinomial distribution parameters and the costs distri-
bution parameters can be found on Figures 13, 14 and 15 respectively and the averages of the
estimates in Table 5. The average estimates are very close to the simulation parameters and this
confirms the accuracy of calibration strategy.
Table 5: Simulation parameters and average estimates
parameter simulation average
value estimate
αλ0 0.5 0.496
κλ0 0.623 0.613
γλ0 0.1 0.099
β1 (−0.2, 0.3, 0.4,−0.1) (−0.199, 0.305, 0.399,−0.101)
β2 0.1 0.088
αc 0.2 0.200
κc 2 2.009
α1 (0.9, 0.4, 0.1, 0.0, 0.1) (0.894, 0.409, 0.101, 0.017, 0.095)
α2 (0.9, 0.5, 0.0, 0.2, 0.2) (0.892, 0.514, .001, 0.215, 0.195)
γm (20, 3) (20.005, 3.001)
γ1 (20, 3) (19.945, 3.013)
γ2 (30, 5) (29.986, 5.008)
θ 0.5 0.511
γc (20, 10) (20.092, 9.976)
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Figure 13: Maximum likelihood estimates for the time-to-failure parameters (red dot: simulation
parameter values)
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Figure 14: Maximum likelihood estimates for the multinomial distribution parameters (red dot:
simulation parameter values)
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Figure 15: Maximum likelihood estimates for the costs distribution parameters (red dot: simulation
parameter values)
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